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1. Introduction 
Innovation is a primary factor for  firms’ competitiveness and growth prospects. R&D and other 
forms of innovation are often supported by governments due to the public nature of knowledge 
generated by such activities, which leads firms to under-invest in R&D with respect to the 
socially desirable value. Market failures induced by knowledge externalities and information 
asymmetries have motivated the adoption of a large spectrum of policy measures (IPRs laws, 
direct funding, fiscal incentives, low interest rates, public research, etc.). However, due to 
increasing constraints on public budgets, the focus of innovation policies, particularly in Europe, 
has recently shifted to strengthening firms’ technological competencies by stimulating R&D 
collaboration with universities (Becker, 2014). 
Much is known about the factors driving firms to cooperate in R&D and, in particular, to 
establish research agreements with research institutions (namely, universities and R&D centres). 
The evidence shows that these collaborations allow firms to internalize the external (spillover) 
effects associated with the creation of new knowledge, and to spread costs and risks implied by 
breakthrough R&D projects (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). Cooperation agreements also 
reduce coordination costs and information leakages with partners, which are hindrances to R&D 
investments (Segarra-Blasco and Arauzo-Carod 2008). Consistent with the predictions of 
industrial organization models, numerous empirical papers have shown that firms engage in 
R&D collaborations when the related benefits are above a certain threshold (Veugelers 1998).  
There is an important aspect of the relationship between firms and R&D partners which 
has received less attention in the literature. This relates to the intensity of firms’ collaborative 
effort and to the factors that can affect such intensity. This issue is relevant not only for 
firms’strategic aims but also for the identification of the best mix of innovation policy 
instruments, necessary to raise private R&D effort towards the socially optimum value (Becker 
2014). The first objective of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature and to analyse the 
determinants of the intensity of the firms’ R&D collaboration with universities, alongside the 
determinants of the decision to participate in an R&D cooperation agreement. Our study 
recognises that, besides universities, other partners can be involved in research cooperation and 
that there are complementarities among different types of agreements, involving different agents. 
We therefore consider firms’ collaboration with companies belonging to the same business group 
and with unaffiliated firms.  
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Another distinguishing feature of our analysis is the data used. Unlike the large majority 
of studies on research cooperation, which rely on the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), we 
make use of novel survey data on manufacturing firms from seven European countries over the 
period 2007-2009 (EFIGE survey). These data provide detailed information on several firm- and 
industry-level characteristics that allow us to correctly identify the factors that influence 
companies’ decision to cooperate in R&D and the intensity of the cooperation.  
Our empirical analysis is based on the estimation of a simultaneous equation system for 
each cooperation type, i.e. with university, affiliated and non-affiliated firms. This method 
accounts for possible unobservable factors influencing the different forms of collaboration and 
the intensity of R&D cooperation with different partners. We also control for reverse causality 
and simultaneity problems by adopting a full-information approach and extend the multivariate 
models of R&D cooperation with reduced-form equations for the potentially endogenous 
regressors (namely, firm’s knowledge base and appropriation abilities). 
We find that firm’s knowledge base, appropriation abilities and incoming spillovers 
determine the intensity of the company’s effort in R&D cooperation with universities (and 
comparably with external group firms). Also, cooperation intensity with institutional actors 
increases with the costs of innovation and with the pressure of market competition (but only if 
competition is not based on product quality improvement). Overall, our results indicate that a 
large portion of the collaborative effort in R&D can be explained by those factors that, in the 
literature, have been identified as drivers of cooperation probability. Conversely, R&D 
cooperation among firms belonging to the same business group seems to be affected by the 
characteristics of the head firm and how it organizes R&D and other activities within the group. 
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
university- and inter-firm partnerships in R&D. Section 3 presents data and summary statistics. 
Section 4 describes the econometric model and the identification strategy. Section 5 reports 
estimation results, while Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Overview of the literature 
Innovation is among the main drivers of firms’ performance and understanding the factors that 
contribute to an increasing innovative effort has been in the economic agenda for a long period 
of time. Over this period, the nature of innovation has changed, becoming increasingly 
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demanding in terms of workers’ skills and complementarities across different disciplines. This 
means that entering research cooperation agreements is gaining increasing importance as a way 
of sharing knowledge and promoting innovations (Cohen et al. 2002). This topic has originated 
much interest in recent years and several contributions have analysed motivations and firm’s 
characteristics that affect the propensity to engage in research agreements. The importance has 
also been recognised at the policy level and governments across the OECD have launched 
initiatives to promote cooperation between university research and industries (Laursen and Salter 
2004).  
 According to the transaction cost theory, firms will perform research in cooperation with 
other partners to share risks, costs and competencies involved in an R&D project (Williamson 
1985, Segarra-Blasco and Arauzo-Carod 2008). Risk is always a large component of R&D 
activities whose returns (and profitability) are highly uncertain. The presence of asymmetric 
information between the firm performing R&D and the investors raises the cost of financing 
R&D and affects the likelihood of obtaining funds from external sources (Hall and Lerner 2009). 
Cost sharing is particularly important among small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), which 
do not always have enough internal funds or collaterals to support their innovative activities 
(Becker 2014). Cooperation can mitigate the impact of these costs, as well reducing transaction 
costs via a better control and monitoring of technology transfer.  The reciprocal nature of the 
relationship can also minimize opportunistic behaviours (Belderbos et al. 2004).  
 Another motivation which has been widely discussed in the literature is the importance of 
cooperation for technology transfer across different agents, i.e. as a way of channelling 
knowledge spillovers. There is general agreement among scholars that knowledge spillovers are 
important as they contribute to the innovative process and to productivity performance (Jaffe 
1986, Griliches 1992). But the presence of spillovers reduces the appropriability of research 
output and can lead to a low level of investments in innovation. The industrial organization 
literature focuses on this aspect and emphasizes the importance of striking a balance between 
information sharing and appropriability within research cooperation agreements. Existing results 
for Belgium show that the benefit from the cooperation increases when spillovers are particularly 
high. Firms will try to limit free-riding behaviours, both within and outside the agreement, by 
controlling the flow of information. In fact, even when participating to an R&D cooperation 
agreement the company has to control the amount of information shared with other partners 
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through some strategic tools of protection; this will increase appropriability and hence the 
propensity to cooperate (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). Additionally, increasing incoming 
spillovers between research partners has been found to raise the profitability and the stability of 
cooperation (Kesteloot and Veugelers 1995). Results for France, partially support the view that 
spillovers matter for cooperation. However, proxies for the (contractual) information flows, such 
as budget spent on paying license fees and patents, have a positive effect on cooperation 
(Negassi 2004).  
 Motivations can differ depending on the type of partner involved in the agreement. 
Universities are driven by the search for funding that can foster further research opportunities. 
Firms are particularly driven by the commercialization of new ideas, via the creation of new 
products or processes (De Fuentes and Dutrenit 2012). However, with the exception of some 
industrial sectors such as biotechnology (Laursen and Salter 2004), university research does not 
always directly translate into new products or services (Pavitt 2001). Hence, although 
appropriability issues are less relevant in the relationship between firm and university, 
differences in objectives and the nature of academic research can be a hindrance to this type of 
cooperation, and can make the outcome of the research partnership more uncertain. Veugelers 
and Cassiman (2005) claim that the gap between universities’ and firms’ objectives is 
particularly large in Europe, where only a small fraction of innovative enterprises use 
universities and public research laboratories as input in their innovation process.
1
  
 Nevertheless, cooperation between firms and universities has been found to play a 
particularly important role in countries specialized in low-technological industries. Segarra-
Blasco and Arauzo-Carod (2008) discuss this issue in relation to Spain, concluding that 
cooperation between firms and Spanish universities is an important vehicle to increase 
innovation effort in this country and aid the catching up process with the rest of Europe. Lopez 
(2008) also claims that the cost-sharing motive is a very important factor in Spain because of the 
lack of external private finance and venture capital. Acs et al. (1994) also show that SMEs 
effectively utilize the results of university research to introduce new products into the market. 
 University-firm collaboration is only one method that the company can exploit to 
improve knowledge transfer. As discussed in Kaiser (2002), among others, firms can in fact 
                                                 
1
 Evidence from the European Community Innovation Survey shows that in 2000 less than 10% of innovative firms 
had cooperative agreements with universities (Veugelers and Cassiman 2005). 
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establish R&D partnership with competitors (horizontal cooperation) and with suppliers and 
customers (vertical cooperation). The main purpose of competitor cooperation is to reduce costs 
and risks associated with developing some new technologies; conversely, customer cooperation 
is targeted to bring adapted or improved products to the market, whilst supplier cooperation is 
more focused on cost reduction. Appropriability concerns differ according to the agent involved 
in the agreement, being more relevant in cooperation with competitors than with other agents 
(Belderbos et al. 2004). The literature has also shown that cooperation with different partners 
usually complements each other (Veugelers and Cassiman 2005). For example, evidence for the 
UK supports this claim as firms that use different external sources of knowledge (competitors, 
suppliers and customers) also tend to use university research more intensively (Laursen and 
Salter 2004).   
 There are also some firms’ characteristics that affect the decision to participate to an 
R&D agreement. These are closely related to the factors that affect the propensity to innovate 
and have been discussed widely in the literature (see the recent surveys by Vivas and Barge-Gil 
2014, and Becker 2014). An important determinant of research cooperation is the availability 
within the firm of the appropriate skills and knowledge necessary to take advantage of the 
innovation produced elsewhere, i.e. the firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). 
Previous innovation experience and previous involvement in R&D cooperation are both 
considered to positively affect the probability of initiating a new cooperation (Negassi 2004, 
Laursen and Salter 2004). R&D intensity is frequently found to have a positive impact on the 
propensity of firms to use universities in their innovative activities (Larsen and Salter 2004).  
 The size of the firm has a positive and significant effect on cooperation as large firms are 
generally more attractive to other partners than small firms (Tether 2002, Negassi 2004, Laursen 
and Salter 2004, Belderbos et al. 2004) and they are more able to combine both internal and 
external knowledge in their innovation strategy  (Veugeler and Cassiman 1999).  The evidence is 
consistent across different countries (Miotti and Sachwald 2003, Negassi 2004, Lopez 2008).
2
 
However, small firms can particularly benefit from research cooperation as, in isolation, they are 
unable to compete with large firms in terms of resources. For example, Motohashi (2005) finds 
that cooperative R&D agreements are becoming particularly important for small firms in Japan. 
                                                 
2
 An exception is Mexico where De Fuentes and Dutrenit (2012) find that firm size, although positive, does not have 
a statistically significant effect on academia-industry cooperation. 
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He observes that over the period 1995-2000 SMEs were reducing the dependence of Japan’s 
system of innovation on in-house R&D conducted within large corporations. From a policy point 
of view, providing support to small firms to enter research agreement can be beneficial for a 
country’s innovative effort (Czarnitzki et al. 2007, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014). 
 Among the factors that promote cooperation, industry affiliation also plays an important 
role. Firms that operate in skill intensive sectors are more likely to cooperate, particularly with 
universities or research institutes. For example, Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) show that 
Belgian firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry are more likely to have cooperative 
agreements with universities. Segarra-Blasco and Arauzo-Carod (2008) report similar evidence 
for Spain.  
 Cooperation can take different forms, from informal technology consultations to 
collaborative R&D conducted on a contractual basis. Firms undertaking both process and 
product innovation are more likely to cooperate in R&D projects. The type of R&D partnership 
differs according to the size of the enterprise, with larger ones primarily using collaborations for 
joint research projects, while a higher percentage of SMEs use technical consulting and take part 
in joint R&D projects targeted to the final product stage (Motohashi 2005).  
 
3. Data 
3.1 Description 
We use data from the public release of the“European Firms in a Global Economy” (EFIGE) 
survey, which provides harmonised information on nationally-representative samples of 
manufacturing firms in seven EU countries: Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. The survey, coordinated by Bruegel and carried out at the beginning of 
2010, collects information on several firm features between 2007 and 2009 (R&D and 
innovation, ownership structure, management practices, workforce profile, international 
activities, financing and banking relationships, market structure and pricing behaviour).
3
 
                                                 
3
 The EFIGE samples consider only firms with 10 and more employees and are stratified across industries (11 
NACE-CLIO industry codes), regions (at the NUTS-1 level of aggregation) and size classes (10-19; 20-49; 50-250; 
more than 250 employees), for a total of about 15,000 firms. To preserve firm’s confidentiality, data on workforce 
have been censored for firms with more than 500 employees, whilst turnover and age are provided only as 
categorical variables. Furthermore, randomised regional identifiers have been used to classify the NUTS1/2 region 
where the firm is localised, whilst randomised industry identifiers have been used to indicate the sector in which the 
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In line with the literature (e.g. Bolli and Woerter 2013), we consider only innovating 
firms, defined as those having carried out R&D activities in the period 2007-2009 (7,545 firms).
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Our main goal is to identify the key determinants of R&D cooperation with universities and 
research institutions, using two specifications: the propensity to cooperate and the intensity of 
R&D projects performed in partnership. Our analysis also recognises that university cooperation 
agreements are not the sole component of a company’s innovation strategy. Unlike the 
Community Innovation Survey, which is the data source of most papers in the field, the EFIGE 
dataset does not distinguish R&D partners between competitors, customers and suppliers. 
However, we are able to consider cooperation with companies belonging to the same business 
group or with unaffiliated firms.  
The dependent variable in the analysis of R&D cooperation propensity is a binary 
indicator of the firm’s decision to undertake projects in collaboration with universities 
(DRDUNI), with unaffiliated firms (DRDOTH), or with firms within the same business group 
(DRDGRO). These decisions are not mutually exclusive as the firm may pursue a multiple 
cooperation strategy. The intensity of R&D cooperation is proxied by the ratio of this R&D 
investment to firm’s turnover. This variable is constructed for collaborations with universities 
(PRDUNI), external companies (PRDOTH) and group members (PRDGRO).
5
  
The EFIGE survey provides information from which we build proxies for key 
determinants of R&D cooperation, such as appropriability conditions and incoming knowledge 
spillovers, and to control for a much broader set of firm’s characteristics than in earlier studies. 
When research output cannot be fully appropriated or knowledge spillovers are generated by 
technological collaborations, firms are stimulated to cooperate. Conversely, by collaborating, 
firms might lose their proprietary knowledge because of information leakages in favour of R&D 
partners. Following Veugelers and Cassiman (2005) we assess the impact of appropriability 
conditions by looking at whether the company uses legal instruments to protect innovation and 
by considering the industry-level effectiveness of the legal framework on intellectual property 
                                                                                                                                                             
firm operates. For more detailed information on the EFIGE dataset see Altomonte and Aquilante (2012). 
4
 This choice is motivated by the fact that information on relevant explanatory variables (like appropriability and 
spillover measures) is available for R&D active firms only. As Belderbos et al. (2004) point out, since we do not 
correct for a possible sample selection bias on R&D participation, our results only refer to R&D active firms. 
5
 Specifically, binary indicators of cooperation propensity are based on questions C20 and C23 of the EFIGE 
questionnaire, while the intensity of each R&D cooperation type is obtained by combining information on firm’s 
R&D investment (question C21) and R&D composition (questions C22 and C23). 
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rights (IPRs). Appropriability at the firm level is measured by a variable indicating whether the 
company exploited patents, trademarks, industry designs or copyrights to protect innovation 
(APPROF). This variable is built by summing up a set of dummies created for each form of 
protection, and is rescaled so that it ranges from 0 (no protection) to 1 (all forms of protection). 
Legal appropriability conditions in the market (APPROI) are measured by the industry-by-
country mean of APPROF: the rationale is that the larger the number of firms protecting 
innovation, the stronger is the legal regime of IPRs protection. Notice that APPROI is taken at 
country and industry level as IPRs regimes change (de jure) across countries but their 
enforcement is (de facto) more stringent in those industries in which patents, trademarks, etc. are 
more effective in protecting innovation (see Aghion et al. 2014). 
Under imperfect appropriability, innovation may generate an outflow of knowledge from 
R&D performers to other firms, a situation that can promote cooperation. To control for this 
effect, we adopt proxies for incoming knowledge spillovers and account for the source-specific 
nature of knowledge generated by various forms of R&D collaboration. Specifically, we consider 
the industry-by-country percentage of companies engaging in each form of R&D collaboration, 
as the more numerous the collaborating firms, the higher the probability of knowledge transfers 
and information leakages. INSPGRO is the percentage of firms undertaking within-group R&D 
collaborations, whilst INSPEXT refers to companies cooperating with external units (both 
unaffiliated firms and universities). For completeness, we also include the industry-by-country 
percentage of companies undertaking internal R&D activities (INSPINT). As these firms do not 
necessarily cooperate, the impact of this variable on R&D collaborations is uncertain.  
The endowment of an internal knowledge base promotes R&D cooperation because it 
facilitates the absorption of knowledge generated by others and it allows the firm to correctly 
assess the potential of research partnership, in terms of technological opportunities, costs, 
profitability, etc. On average, the effect of absorptive capacity is stronger for firms which are 
involved in basic R&D and cooperate with universities, and weaker for those companies 
establishing technological cooperation with competitors due to a higher risk of knowledge 
leakages (Cassiman and Vuegelers 2006; Belderbos et al. 2004). We approximate the firm’s 
endowment of internal knowledge with the share of R&D workers on firm employment 
(RDINT). 
The role played by obstacles to innovation is accounted for by two dummy variables, 
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which capture costs and risks associated with research projects (COST and RISK). COST 
identifies firms that consider regulation, lack of appropriate finance or personnel and 
organizational rigidities as main obstacles to innovation. These factors raise the cost of research 
and the need to share these costs can promote cooperation. The variable RISK identifies those 
companies indicating excessive economic risks, lack of information on markets, and the lack of 
customer responsiveness to new products, as main impediments to research engagement. 
Although a higher risk should increase firms’ propensity to collaborate in R&D, the impact of 
this variable has been found to vary greatly in relation to the nature of technological 
collaboration. For instance, risk constraints are found to increase the probability of cooperation 
with competitors and customers in Belderbos et al. (2004), whereas negative effects arise for 
R&D collaborations with universities in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). 
Market competition is another factor that may shape the firm’s attitude to R&D 
agreements. Generally, the market structure determines the firm’s incentives to innovate (Aghion 
et al. 2005, Boone 2008). The impact of competition on innovation might however vary in 
relation to the market where the firm is active and to the nature of the competitive strategy 
pursued (Bolli and Woerter 2013). To control for the intensity of competition we use the 
percentage of firms having competitors abroad (COMPINT). Referring to foreign competitors 
mitigates the risk of estimation bias induced by possible feedbacks from innovation and R&D 
cooperation to the market structure (Czarnitzki et al. 2014), as successful innovators may 
become the market leader and increase their market share. This distortion is more plausible in 
home markets dominated by one or few big firms (national champions), or in small niche market. 
To assess the nature of the prevailing competitive strategy, we use the percentage of companies 
that compete on product prices, i.e. stating that the price of their products is set by the market 
(PCOMP), and the percentage of innovative sales, which can be used as a proxy for product 
quality competition (QCOMP). All these variables, measured as industry-by-country means, 
avoid the potential estimation bias associated with the firms’ subjective evaluation of 
competition, which characterizes works based on CIS data.  
We also consider a broad set of firm’s characteristics. Generally, innovation activities 
and R&D collaborations impose high fixed costs of setting up research labs and accessing ad-hoc 
funds, which only larger firms can afford (Cassiman and Vuegelers 2002). Also, large firms may 
be engaged in multi-product productions or deal with multiple technologies and, hence, have 
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greater incentives to undertake R&D cooperation. We control for firm size using the level of firm 
employment, expressed in logs (SIZE), and we assess the presence of non-linear effects by 
introducing the square of employment (SIZE2). The style of firm management may also 
determine both the nature and the intensity of R&D partnership and hence we consider a dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm adopts a decentralised decisional pattern (DEMANAG). 
These companies are expected to establish more research agreements as they adopt practices for 
performance monitoring, target setting and incentives, which altogether favour profit-seeking 
activities such as R&D (Bloom et al., 2014).   
An additional characteristic that we include in our analysis is the age of the firm. 
Although younger firms are generally considered to face higher organizational and financial 
barriers when engaging in external R&D agreements, they may also be  more sensitive to the 
opportunities offered by collaborating in specialised research niches or in emerging 
technological fields. For example, dynamic start-ups are particularly capable of transferring 
university research into commercial innovation and universities support the creation of such 
start-ups by providing human capital and scientific competences (Laursen and Salter 2004). As a 
result, it is not easy to predict the impact of age on R&D cooperation, especially if one controls 
for firm size and managerial practices. In the regression analysis, we consider two dummy 
variables identifying firms less than 6 years old (YOUNG) and those aged between 7 and 20 
years (MEDAGE).
6
  
Belonging to a business group influences how the firm organises internal activities and 
interacts with other firms. This effect clearly depends on the nature of the leading firm (national 
or multinational) and on how R&D tasks are planned and managed within the group, i.e. whether 
they are concentrated in few companies or spread out across different R&D active units. 
Affiliated firms can usually draw on larger resources, although this does not necessarily imply 
that they have higher opportunities to cooperate (Belderbos et al. 2004). As in Bolli and Woerter 
(2013), we use a dummy variable to indicate foreign ownership (FOROWN). To fully account 
for the degree of firm internationalisation we also construct a dummy that indicates whether 
companies are active abroad due to importing, exporting, offshoring or FDI activities 
(ABROAD). The use of FOROWN and ABROAD should guarantee that COMPINT, as 
                                                 
6
 These are the only age variables that are available in the EFIGE dataset. 
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described above, genuinely captures the intensity of foreign competition faced by the firm. 
We also assess how the financial structure of the firm influences the way R&D activities 
are organized. Financial resources available to the firm usually rise with its size due, for instance, 
to a greater cash-flow or having more tangible assets to collateralize. Moreover, companies may 
differ in how they exploit external funds (bank credit, bonds, stock market, etc.). There is some 
evidence documenting that firms largely dependent on external finance innovate more, and grow 
faster, than those relying on internal resources  (Brown et al. 2009, 2012). We therefore include a 
dummy identifying firms using external sources to finance their (general) activities (EXTFIN). 
Finally, we account for whether firms that benefit from public support for R&D engage 
more in technological collaborations. On average, these firms are more aware of risks and costs 
of innovation, and better evaluate returns to R&D cooperation. However, we note that R&D 
public support weakens financial constraints, hence reducing the firm’s incentives to cooperate 
(Belderbos et al. 2004). We consider two types of public incentives to R&D, namely R&D tax 
credit and R&D subsidy. Fiscal incentives are systematic policy instruments consisting of tax 
discounts proportional to the amount spent by the firm for carrying out R&D (labs, researchers, 
scientific equipment, etc.); in practice, firms anticipate funds to perform R&D and then claim tax 
deductions from liabilities. Conversely, R&D subsidies are discretionary measures that reflect 
the awarding criteria chosen by the public agency arranging the R&D programme. To be eligible 
for the R&D grant, applicant firms might also be forced to cooperate with other R&D active 
units (Czarnitzki et al. 2007, Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento 2014). Therefore, we expect that R&D 
subsidies are more likely to affect the choice and the intensity of research cooperation, while  
fiscal incentives might not influence firms’ decisions to cooperate. We measure the impact of 
both types of R&D public support with two dummy variables, denoted by RDSUB and 
RDTAX.
7
 
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. Our sample of innovating firms is composed mainly by 
companies localised in Italy (22%), Germany (21%) and France (20%). The number of Austrian 
and Hungarian companies is rather low and the performance of these countries may be somewhat 
                                                 
7
 A full description of the variables used in the regression analysis is provided in Table A.1 of the Appendix. 
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biased. On average, 9.6% of firms undertake research projects in collaboration with universities. 
This percentage ranges from 20.7% in Austria to 6.6% in France. The propensity to collaborate 
within the business group is higher than any other mode of R&D cooperation (17.5% for the total 
sample), especially for British companies (24%). Establishing R&D cooperation agreements with 
unaffiliated firms is clearly more problematic, especially when these involve competitors, as 
appropriability concerns become more severe. This explains why the number of firms involved 
in this type of technological collaborations is low (5%). Only firms in Austria and France reveal 
a relatively high propensity towards R&D cooperation with unaffiliated firms (between 8 and 
10%). 
EU firms do not significantly differ in terms of R&D intensity, as measured by the ratio 
of research expenditure to sales (7.2% for R&D active firms). Notably, Germany stands out for 
the highest share of turnover spent for formal innovation (8%). The intensity of cooperation with 
universities, as the share of turnover of the firms engaged in such type of cooperation, is less 
than 2%. Amongst the largest economies (which are better represented in the sample), this 
percentage rises to 2.02% in Italy and 2.54% in Spain. The intensity of R&D collaboration is 
higher for external partnerships, namely 3.22% with unaffiliated firms and 2.76% with affiliated 
firms. 
Average values for the explanatory variables are reported in Table 2. Some brief points 
are in order. Firstly, firms engaging in R&D agreements with universities are more R&D 
intensive, make a wider use of IPRs tools and are very active abroad. Moreover, these companies 
rely more on external sources of finance and take larger benefits from R&D public support, 
either in the form of direct funding or fiscal incentives. Secondly, companies collaborating in 
R&D with unaffiliated firms adopt less decentralized management practices, are less active 
abroad and are more dependent on external finance. Lastly, the size of companies involved in 
within-group R&D cooperation are considerably larger than the rest of the sample. These firms 
are more likely to be foreign owned and to decentralise decision-making.  
 
4. Empirical model 
4.1 Specification 
We investigate the drivers of firm R&D collaborations with universities, in relation to the other 
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forms of R&D partnership, in terms of the propensity to cooperate and the intensity of 
cooperation efforts. To account for unobservable factors that may simultaneously influence how 
companies organise external R&D, we estimate a system of three equations in which each 
dependent variable corresponds to a type of R&D cooperation, namely, cooperation with 
universities, with unaffiliated firms and within the business group (Belderbos et al. 2004, Bolli 
and Woerter 2013). Assuming a common set of determinants, each equation is expressed as: 
 (1) 
with i, c and j denoting firm, country and industry, respectively. yim is the outcome indicator 
observed on the m-th type of cooperation. This indicator is expressed as a binary variable in the 
estimation of the cooperation propensity; in the analysis of cooperation intensity, the indicator 
represents the ratio of R&D investment performed in partnership over firm turnover. The set of 
explanatory variables in equation (1) includes the main factors identified in the literature as 
determinants of R&D cooperation (R&D intensity, Incoming Spillovers, Appropriability, 
Innovation Obstacles and Competition). Other is a vector collecting additional firm-specific 
characteristics. Each specification includes a set of country dummies to account for the effect of 
unobserved nation-wide confounding factors (institutional setting, general competition policies, 
asymmetries in business cycle, etc.). The impact of industry characteristics is assumed to be 
country-specific and is captured by the set of indicators denoted by the subscript cj. 
The error terms  are allowed to be correlated across the m equations, with a non-
diagonal covariance matrix . This correlation may be due to unobservable factors that 
influence whether, and how, firms undertake research projects with external R&D active units. If 
significant cross-equation dependence exists, the univariate estimation would lead to biased and 
inefficient parameter estimates. Positive correlation would indicate complementarity between 
cooperation types, whilst a negative correlation would suggest substitutability. Complementarity 
effects may arise when the marginal costs of entering an additional form of R&D cooperation are 
low compared to the fixed costs necessary to initiate external collaborations. Substitutability 
effects may be determined, for instance, by financial constraints or (locked-in) technological 
capabilities which are specific to cooperation types. As pointed out by Belderbos et al. (2004), a 
shortcoming of the (recursive) simultaneous multivariate approach is that it does not distinguish 
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the sources of correlation among equations. The dependence between R&D cooperation types 
may indeed be due to firm-specific characteristics, to factors common only to a sub-sample of 
companies, or to general idiosyncratic shocks that influence firm’s R&D collaborations in a 
heterogeneous way.
8
 Unlike earlier studies, we are able to control for a larger set of firm-specific 
characteristics, thus reducing the risk of omitted variables problems and leaving only a small 
proportion of cross-equation correlation unexplained. 
In order to analyse the firm’s propensity to engage in different types of R&D 
cooperation, we consider a multivariate (three-equation) binary choice (probit) model: 
       (2) 
with  and where yim is the observed binary indicator for the firm’s cooperation 
choice. xim are  vectors of explanatory variables,  are conformable parameter vectors and, 
 is a set of error terms which are distributed as standard multivariate normal with covariances 
 (for ). For each firm, we observe whether it cooperates with 
universities, with unaffiliated firms or within the business group. Each combination can be then 
represented as a 3-tuple of values of the vector (DRDUNIi, DRDOTHi, DRDGROi) with 
probability: 
  (3) 
 is the trivariate cumulative standard normal distribution,  are sign variables 
(equal to 1 or –1 depending on whether the binary dependent variable is equal to 1 or 0) and the 
covariance matrix R has elements defined as  (for ). 
The log-likelihood function of the trivariate probit model is given by
 and can be evaluated by means of maximum 
                                                 
8 
A fully simultaneous multivariate model (i.e., a model in which each R&D cooperation indicator also enters the 
other cooperation equations of the system as an explanatory variable) would be more appropriate to disentangle 
complementarity/substitutability effects from residual correlations. Though, this approach is unfeasible for the 
present analysis due to the lack of valid restrictions on the parameters (and support) of error terms. These restrictions 
are necessary to rule out regions of incoherency/incompleteness and ensure parameter identifiability (Lewbel 2007). 
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simulated likelihood (MSL) methods (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003).
9
 
Similar to the analysis of cooperation propensity, we jointly model the determinants of 
cooperation intensity for the three different forms of technological collaboration. To 
accommodate for the fact that the dependent variables are censored at zero, and to allow for 
cross-equation correlation, we consider a trivariate Tobit system (Amemiya 1974). As its 
univariate counterpart, this system is based on the assumption that censoring is governed by the 
same stochastic process determining the value of the dependent variables, and can be formalised 
as follows: 
      (4) 
yim now represents the intensity of the m-th cooperation type, and the error terms  are 
distributed as multivariate normal with zero means, variances  and covariances  (for 
 and ). The  vectors xim include the same set of explanatory variables used 
for cooperation propensity. As shown in Arias and Cox (2001), the contribution to the likelihood 
function of an observation in which the first r equations out of m are censored at zero is: 
      (5) 
where  is the multivariate normal probability density function. The previous expression 
represents a portion of the likelihood function with a r-dimensional definite integral, which does 
not have a closed form solution and has to be evaluated numerically. As for the multivariate 
probit, estimation of the trivariate Tobit system is performed with MSL methods.
10
 
 
4.2 Endogeneity issues 
The empirical models outlined above assume that all covariates are exogenous with respect to the 
firm’s choice to cooperate. This hypothesis may be too strong and estimates may be biased in 
presence of reverse causality or simultaneity feedbacks. To avoid these problems, we adopt a 
                                                 
9
 The MSL estimation procedure is based on the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) multivariate normal 
simulator, with 200 random draws for each observation. Estimation has been carried out using the Stata conditional 
mixed process estimator (CMP) developed by Roodman (2011). 
10
 The GHK multivariate normal simulator, with 200 random draws for each observation, is used to obtain MSL 
estimates of the trivariate Tobit model. 
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full-information approach and consider a mixed-process system of equations, which combines 
the trivariate probit (or Tobit) model with additional reduced-form equations for the potentially 
endogenous regressors. This estimation strategy is more efficient, despite being potentially less 
robust and computationally more complex, than limited-information and two-stages approaches 
commonly used in earlier studies (see, e.g., Veugelers and Cassiman 2005; Belderbos et al. 
2004). 
Within this mixed-process system, a formal test of endogeneity can be obtained by 
testing the statistical significance of the estimated correlation coefficients ( ) between the 
errors of the reduced-form equations and the three structural equations for the R&D cooperation 
types. If the unobserved factors affecting the potentially endogenous regressors also influence 
the firm’s R&D cooperation, it will show up in significant cross-equation correlation. Therefore, 
a preliminary step of our analysis consists in assessing the endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables in the full mixed-process model. After testing for endogeneity, consistent and efficient 
estimates are obtained by means of the conditional maximum likelihood estimation, imposing 
appropriate restrictions on the correlation “structure” between the errors of the structural and 
reduced-form equations. In this way, our multivariate mixed-process model allows to address 
endogeneity and obtain efficient estimates (see Lopez 2008). 
Following previous studies, we focus on two potentially endogenous (firm-level) 
explanatory variables: internal knowledge (RDINT) and appropriability (APPROF). Firms may 
exploit technological knowledge and managerial expertise developed in research collaborations 
to increase returns to in-house R&D. As a result, these companies may be induced to allocate 
further resources to internal research projects. In this case, causality would run from R&D 
cooperation to internal knowledge. Similarly, when research collaborations bear breakthrough 
innovations, which have the potential for further technological developments or immediate 
market exploitation, the firm is more likely to use IPRs tools to appropriate returns to research. 
Appropriate exclusion restrictions have to be imposed to improve identification of the 
system. A set of factors, assumed to be orthogonal to R&D cooperation forms, is thus included in 
the equations of potentially endogenous regressors (RDINT and APPROF). The impact of these 
variables on R&D cooperation is identified by exploiting variation in firms’ response to the 
market collapse of late 2008 (REDSALE), as it can be considered as broadly exogenous with 
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respect to the decision to cooperate in R&D, Specifically, we use a dummy variable for those 
companies experiencing a reduction in sales between 2008 and 2009. 
In addition, to better assess the impact of internal knowledge on R&D cooperation, we 
include the average value of R&D intensity of the firms localised in the same NUTS 
administrative area of the company.
11
 This variable should capture regional variation in the 
conditions which make it profitable to invest in R&D, namely a better higher education sector, a 
more efficient government,
12
 better communication infrastructures, a more structured credit 
system, etc. As discussed below, this proximity indicator (denoted by RDREG) is unrelated to 
the firm’s attitude to cooperate in R&D as we adopt spillover proxies that are more relevant for 
this type of company decision. Therefore, RDREG can be safely used to predict the effect of 
internal knowledge on R&D cooperation (RDINT).  
The impact of appropriability is predicted by the number of banking relationships, used 
here as a proxy for the firm’s attitude to disclose confidential information. Companies fearing the 
loss of proprietary knowledge usually diversify their relationship with banks and other financial 
institutions (Hernández-Cánovas and Köeter-Kant, 2010). This strategy aims to prevent possible 
leakages of confidential information, preserve decision-making independence, and reduce rent 
appropriation by banks, which characterize single-bank relationships (Detragiache et al., 2000). 
It is reasonable to expect that firms with multiple-bank relationships adopt conservative 
strategies in technological knowledge management and protect their innovation by legal 
mechanisms. Hence, in addition to sales’ reduction, we use the number of banking relationships 
maintained by the firm (NBANKS) as a predictor of appropriability. 
  
                                                 
11 
For each firm, we compute a regional mean of R&D intensity excluding the value of its RDINT. 
12
For instance, regional governments may facilitate firm R&D by efficiently managing EU regional funds for 
competitiveness, technology and employment targets. 
19 
 
5. Results 
5.1 The Probability of cooperating in R&D 
Table 3 shows estimates for the multivariate probit model.
13
 The table displays the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables obtained after controlling for the endogeneity of firm 
knowledge (RDINT) and appropriability capacity (APPROF).  
In the Appendix, we report the reduced form estimates, together with the residual 
correlation coefficients between the reduced-form and structural equations of the system (Table 
A.3). The reduced form estimates indicate that instruments significantly influence, and with the 
expected impact, both internal knowledge and appropriability.
14
 The residuals’ structure of such 
estimates reveals that significant correlation exists only between the equations for R&D intensity 
and for R&D partnership with unaffiliated firms ( ). Conversely, 
appropriability is exogenous to all cooperation choices. Based on these results, our estimates for 
R&D cooperation probabilities are obtained imposing this “structure” of endogeneity on the 
multivariate mixed-process model.
15
 
Results in Table 3 show that all pair-wise residual correlations are significant and 
positive, suggesting that there is complementarity between R&D cooperation choices, and that 
university cooperation cannot be analysed separately from the other forms of collaboration. Our 
findings indicate that internal knowledge, appropriability and incoming spillovers significantly 
influence the probability of participating in an R&D cooperation agreement, even though these 
factors have a differentiated impact on cooperation types. R&D intensity (RDINT) positively 
influences the decision to cooperate with universities and with other firms, but this variable has 
no effect on cooperation among firms belonging to the same business group.
16
 Within group 
                                                 
13
 All regressions use sampling weights and robust standard errors clustered at the regional (NUTS1 or 2) level. 
14
 Instruments are jointly significant with LR test statistics equal to 11.88 (p-value = 0.002) and 25.46 (p-value = 
0.000) in the equations for R&D intensity and appropriability, respectively. The appropriateness of instrumental 
variables is further assessed by testing their exogeneity with respect to R&D cooperation choices. To this aim, we 
adopt the “informal” approach devised by Evans and Schwab (1995): we include the instruments, together with 
R&D intensity and appropriability indicators, in all the cooperation equations and then test for their joint 
significance. Results indicate that instrument exclusion cannot be rejected, with p-values equal to 0.4953, 0.6992 
and 0.2227, respectively. 
15
 Estimates of the multivariate mixed-process model with unconstrained covariance structure (i.e., assuming both 
internal knowledge and firm appropriability as endogenous), not reported but available from the authors, show a 
substantial efficiency loss. 
16
 In the exogenous model (see Table A.2), R&D intensity is insignificant in the equation for cooperation with 
unaffiliated firms, suggesting that our treatment of endogeneity helps remove important measurement errors in such 
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cooperation is more likely to be determined by the leader company, its technological capabilities 
and management practices. The insignificance of firms' R&D intensity for within-group R&D 
cooperation would suggest that the bulk of R&D activities are concentred in few companies and 
only minor research tasks are assigned to affiliates, irrespective of their knowledge base.  
Better appropriability conditions (APPROF) stimulate firms’ engagement in R&D 
collaboration with universities and unaffiliated firms, as they are likely to reduce the extent of 
outgoing spillovers (Abramovsky et al. 2009). Conversely, the degree of enforcement of IPRs 
(APPROI) is negatively related to R&D agreements with unaffiliated firms. A high effectiveness 
of the IPRs system usually discourages free-riding behaviours and stabilizes cooperative 
agreements; however, strict legal protection of innovation output also limits the scope for 
internalizing information flows, reducing technological collaborations (Lopez, 2008). 
Another valuable finding in our analysis concerns the importance of knowledge 
spillovers in raising the probability of cooperating. The propensity to establish R&D agreements 
with universities rises with the amount of knowledge created within external collaborations, 
taken as whole (institutional cooperation and cooperation with unaffiliated firms). However, the 
impact of external knowledge appears slightly larger for the probability of R&D cooperation 
with unaffiliated firms (0.55 vs 0.43). Notably, the share of firms performing in-house R&D 
(INSPINT) is unrelated to R&D cooperation. This suggests that information leakages generated 
by such firms are irrelevant for the decision of the other companies to undertake external 
research projects.  
Among obstacles to innovation, only cost factors (COST) are found to significantly 
stimulate firms to cooperate in R&D. This effect is limited to research agreements with 
universities and unaffiliated firms, corroborating the view that the characteristics of the leader 
company prevail over cost and risk factors in shaping collaborations within the business group.  
Our indicators of market structure indicate that the intensity of market competition 
influences firms’ participation in R&D collaborations with institutional partners, such as 
universities or research centres. More specifically, the propensity to engage in institutional R&D 
agreements increases with the competitive pressure of the industry (COMPINT). This suggests 
that, via university cooperation, companies aim to obtain breakthrough innovations while, at the 
                                                                                                                                                             
variable that, otherwise, would attenuate towards zero the parameter. 
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same time, avoiding knowledge leakages to competitors. Given the general nature of knowledge 
underlying institutional research projects, firms are less inclined towards these collaborations 
when competition is based on product quality improvement (QCOMP), which mainly relies on 
applied research and incremental innovation. Price competition (PCOMP) does not exert a 
significant impact on any form of cooperation. The insignificant effect of price competition on 
external group R&D partnerships may be due to the opposite effect that this explanatory variable 
has on collaborations with customers, suppliers and competitors that are considered altogether in 
our analysis.  
Further interesting insights emerge from the assessment of other firms’s characteristics. 
Firm size is crucial for all cooperation types.
17
 There is also evidence that management practices 
allowing for decentralized decision-making (DEMANAGE) are associated with a greater 
engagement in technological collaborations with universities and, comparably, with affiliated 
companies. Within-group collaborations involve more middle-aged firms and fewer young firms 
(MEDAGE and YOUNG). The fact that younger companies have no preferential attitude to 
cooperate in R&D suggests that their difficulties mostly derive from a lack of financial resources 
and managerial competences (Laursen and Salter 2004). These arguments are corroborated by 
the significance of the dummy for external finance dependence (EXTFIN). On average, firms 
using external funds are more prone to external research collaborations. Conversely, this 
financial condition is unrelated to R&D partnerships among affiliated firms as fund transfers 
may be arranged within the group by the leader company, limiting the dependence of affiliates 
on external finance. The leadership of a multinational group (FOROWN) is influential for the 
organization of R&D tasks across group members. Foreign-owned firms are not necessarily 
active in international markets with imports, exports or other activities. This explains why 
ABROAD is not significant for within-group R&D cooperation. On the other hand, 
internationally active firms are more prone to undertake university cooperation; perhaps, these 
companies have greater awareness of the potential offered by the international market, in terms 
of commercial purposes or knowledge transfers, and therefore seek to develop breakthrough 
innovations in collaboration with institutional partners.  
A wide heterogeneity emerges in the impact of R&D policy instruments. R&D 
                                                 
17
 In Table 3 and 4, the reported marginal effects of firm size account for non-linearity associated with the quadratic 
terms. 
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cooperation is unaffected by fiscal incentives to R&D (RDTAX) due to the automatic nature of 
such instruments, which do not alter firm incentives to innovate and to initiate technological 
collaborations. Rather, there is some (weak) indication that firms benefiting from R&D tax 
credits have a lower propensity to cooperate with external group firms, probably because they 
are less financially constrained. A different picture emerges for direct R&D funding (RDSUB). 
On average, firms receiving R&D subsidies are more likely to establish research collaborations 
with universities and unaffiliated companies. Finally, country effects mainly influence 
collaboration with universities and with firms external to the business group. In particular, firms 
in Austria and Germany have a higher propensity to establish research agreements with 
universities, while companies in France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain cooperate less with 
unaffiliated firms, compared to the reference country (UK). 
 
5.2 Intensity of R&D cooperation 
As a novel contribution to the literature, we estimate the impact of our set of explanatory 
variables on the intensity of R&D performed in cooperation. Table 4 reports the marginal effects 
on the conditional intensities of R&D cooperation obtained from the trivariate Tobit system, after 
addressing the endogeneity issues.
18
 Estimated correlations of unobservables across equations 
indicate the presence of complementarity also in the intensity of R&D cooperation forms, which 
is particularly significant between collaborations with universities and with unaffiliated firms. 
Most variables influencing the probability of cooperation are also found to affect the 
extent of technological collaborations. This finding suggests that these factors not only lead firms 
to reach the critical threshold to initiate R&D cooperation, but also explain variation in their 
cooperative effort. There are nonetheless a few interesting differences with respect to the probit 
estimates. Although firm size positively affects the effort in each cooperation form, the 
magnitude of this effect is larger for within-group collaborations. Also, the proportion of R&D 
performed with universities is not significantly higher for firms active abroad. Albeit these 
                                                 
18
 Coherently with multivariate probit results, estimates of reduced form equations reported in Table A.5 show that 
there is endogeneity only between internal knowledge and R&D performed in cooperation with unaffiliated firms 
( ). Our instruments are jointly significant in the equations for R&D intensity and 
appropriability, with LR test statistics equal to 12.57 (p-value = 0.002) and 24.27 (p-value = 0.000), and do not 
significantly affect R&D collaboration decisions as their exclusion from cooperation equations cannot be rejected, 
with p-values equal to 0.3240, 0.3226 and 0.3565, respectively. Table A.4 reports estimates assuming exogenous 
covariates.  
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companies are more likely to explore new ways to increase competitiveness through R&D 
collaborations with universities, probably they do not have the competencies necessary to engage 
intensively in such research projects. Furthermore, and consistently with the results in Table 3, 
estimates in Table 4 indicate that firms benefiting from R&D tax credit cooperate less in R&D 
with unaffiliated firms (i.e., customers, suppliers and competitors), as they are likely larger, less 
financially constrained and with more research experience (Busom et al. 2012). 
Because of lower appropriability concerns, knowledge circulates more easily among firms 
belonging to the same business group, increasing the share of R&D that these companies 
perform together. The magnitude of this spillover effect (INSPGRO) is between 40 and 80% as 
large as the one estimated for external knowledge on the intensity of R&D cooperation with 
unaffiliated firms and universities. A unitary increase in the spillover measure (i.e. the 
percentage of firms involved in a given cooperation type) raises the intensity of R&D 
cooperation within the group by 4.3%, the intensity of university cooperation by 2.4% and other 
R&D collaborations by 3.1%. The stimulus of internal knowledge (RDINT) is much higher for 
cooperation with unaffiliated firms than for university cooperation, in line with the results of the 
probability model (Table 3). Focusing on the impact of market competition on university R&D 
cooperation (COMPINT), the effect of competitive pressure appears sizeable, as an unitary 
increase in this variable (to say from 54 to 55% of firms facing foreign competitors) causes a 
0.75% increase in the intensity of institutional cooperation. However, this effect is 
counterbalanced by the impact exerted by product quality competition. To mimic the strategy of 
analysis followed by Bolli and Woerter (2013), who find an inverted U-shaped relation between 
university cooperation and price competition, and an U-shaped relationship with quality 
competition, we also included the square of PCOMP and QCOMP, but these quadratic terms 
were insignificant (and hence omitted). Another interesting finding is that there are systematic 
differences also in the intensity of R&D cooperation between firms localised in different 
countries, with Austrian and German companies being more intensively engaged in institutional 
R&D agreements. This is consistent with Cunningham and Link (2014) who document that large 
cross-country differentials persist in Europe in R&D collaborations between universities and the 
business sector. This variation can be largely explained by the university deficiency of R&D 
funds and infrastructures, as well as by the firms’ concern about the loss of their intellectual 
property. All these factors reduce the extent of university-firm R&D collaborations, whilst the 
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collaborative effort is higher when universities can more easily access business-sector R&D 
facilities. 
Overall, our analysis shares some traits with Carboni (2012) who estimates the 
determinants of total expenses on R&D collaboration (in per worker terms) on a sample of 
Italian manufacturing firms over the period 2001-2003. Differently from such work (and 
abstracting from the sample composition), we are able to distinguish between the intensity of 
R&D cooperation types and treat them jointly in a multiple-equation system. Our study also 
addresses the endogeneity issue of the main explanatory variables.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Following the literature on R&D cooperation choices, this paper has investigated the drivers of 
university cooperation among EU firms. Our analysis has accounted for possible 
complementarity or substitutability effects between institutional R&D partnerships and 
alternative cooperation strategies, i.e. technological collaborations with firms belonging to the 
same business group or with unaffiliated companies. Furthermore, we have addressed 
endogeneity issues associated with the main determinants of R&D cooperation (internal 
knowledge and appropriation abilities).  
The paper makes some important contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge, 
this is the first study investigating the drivers of the intensity of R&D cooperation. Second, the 
analysis exploits information from a novel dataset (EFIGE) that provides richer information on 
firm characteristics than the Community Innovation Survey (i.e., the main data source for the 
studies in the field). Third, the examination of the drivers of R&D cooperation uses variables 
which do not reflect the firms’ subjective assessment of relevant sources of knowledge and 
protection methods, thus limiting reverse causality problems.  
Our empirical model is sufficiently general to explain quite well both the propensity and 
the intensity of firm cooperation in R&D with different partners. We find that European firms 
perform a larger share of R&D in cooperation with research institutions, the larger their 
knowledge base and appropriation abilities. Incoming spillovers are another crucial factor 
determining the extent of university cooperation. Firms’ effort in university cooperation 
increases with the costs of innovation and with the competitive pressure of the market (except 
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when competition is based on product quality improvement). On average, larger firms and those 
relying on external finance or public R&D funding perform a larger proportion of their research 
in partnership with universities. 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Average Propensity and Intensity of R&D Cooperation 
 Country: 
 AUT FRA GER HUN ITA SPA UK Total 
         R&D firms (number) 246 1506 1598 131 1661 1303 1100 7545 
(% of total sample) 3.3 20.0 21.2 1.7 22.0 17.3 14.6 100 
         
Cooperating firms (in %):         
University 20.7 6.6 11.1 18.3 7.7 10.0 10.2 9.6 
Other firms 9.8 7.8 3.4 6.9 3.6 3.2 6.7 5.0 
Group 19.9 13.0 16.1 13.0 18.7 17.7 24.1 17.5 
         
R&D expenses on turnover 6.8 6.2 8.0 6.3 7.3 7.5 6.9 7.2 
         
R&D cooperation intensity on turnover 
(conditional on cooperating):         
University 2.85 1.66 1.84 2.54 2.02 2.54 1.22 1.97 
Other firms 3.35 2.02 2.96 4.68 4.11 3.98 2.54 3.22 
Group 2.61 2.14 4.16 1.99 2.75 4.54 1.84 2.76 
         
Notes: cooperation frequencies and average intensities are computed using sample weights. 
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Table 2 – Determinants of R&D Cooperation: Cross-Country Mean 
Variables 
All R&D 
firms 
Firms collaborating with: 
Universities 
External 
firms Group 
     Main explanatory variables     
RDINT 11.6 12.9 11.8 9.45 
APPROF 0.16 0.26 0.21 0.22 
APPROI 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 
INSPEXT 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 
INSPGRO 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22 
INSPINT 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 
COST 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.15 
RISK 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 
COMPIN 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.59 
PCOMP 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.38 
QCOMP 21.3 21.3 21.6 20.9 
     
Other firm characteristics     
SIZE (log) 3.79 4.10 3.81 4.62 
DEMANAG 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.48 
YOUNG 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 
MEDAGE 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 
FOROWN 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.48 
ABROAD 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.94 
EXTFIN 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.37 
RDSUB 0.19 0.27 0.21 0.24 
RDTAX 0.17 0.28 0.20 0.19 
     
Notes: descriptive statistics are computed using sample weights. 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
Table 3 – Probability of R&D cooperation; Multivariate Probit Model with Endogenous Explanatory Variables: 
Marginal Effects 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
University cooperation 
(2) 
Other firms cooperation 
(3) 
Within group cooperation 
    RDINT 0.0006** 0.0054*** -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0001) 
APPROF 0.1014*** 0.1425*** 0.0075 
 (0.0150) (0.0183) (0.0065) 
APPROI -0.0272 -0.3837** 0.0292 
 (0.1193) (0.1708) (0.0628) 
INSPEXT 0.4573*** 0.5376*** -0.0237 
 (0.0998) (0.1413) (0.0351) 
INSPGRO 0.1145 -0.2239 0.3446*** 
 (0.1576) (0.2124) (0.0617) 
INSPINT 0.0310 -0.2699 -0.0705 
 (0.1474) (0.2508) (0.0730) 
COST 0.0579*** 0.0693** -0.0014 
 (0.0163) (0.0286) (0.0085) 
RISK 0.0281 0.0171 0.0142 
 (0.0341) (0.0409) (0.0155) 
COMPIN 0.1217*** -0.0062 -0.0249 
 (0.0460) (0.0627) (0.0196) 
PCOMP 0.0783 0.0577 -0.0069 
 (0.0854) (0.1328) (0.0388) 
QCOMP -0.0027*** 0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0005) 
SIZE (log) 0.0192*** 0.0220** 0.0153*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0110) (0.0039) 
DEMANAG 0.0153** 0.0114 0.0139*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0113) (0.0034) 
YOUNG -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0187* 
 (0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0096) 
MEDAGE -0.0001 -0.0081 0.0092** 
 (0.0083) (0.0104) (0.0040) 
FOROWN 0.0077 -0.0140 0.0530*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0143) (0.0063) 
ABROAD 0.0244** -0.0097 -0.0063 
 (0.0124) (0.0156) (0.0067) 
EXTFIN 0.0297*** 0.0432*** -0.0053 
 (0.0070) (0.0106) (0.0052) 
RDTAX 0.0142 -0.0262* -0.0010 
 (0.0100) (0.0146) (0.0053) 
RDSUB 0.0480*** 0.0429*** 0.0006 
 (0.0109) (0.0153) (0.0047) 
AUT 0.0403** -0.0580 -0.0109 
 (0.0175) (0.0410) (0.0167) 
FRA -0.0127 -0.0712** 0.0043 
 (0.0232) (0.0340) (0.0099) 
GER 0.0660*** -0.0579** -0.0154* 
 (0.0137) (0.0254) (0.0086) 
HUN 0.0435 -0.1870*** -0.0228 
 (0.0394) (0.0604) (0.0196) 
ITA 0.0144 -0.0592** -0.0020 
 (0.0184) (0.0292) (0.0098) 
SPA 0.0242 -0.0797** -0.0108 
 (0.0211) (0.0329) (0.0102) 
    
 0.6365***   
(0.0424)   
 0.1223**   
(0.0488)   
 0.1491***   
(0.0444)   
    Significance of country fixed effects 56.32*** [0.0000] 15.82** [0.0148] 8.17 [0.2262] 
Obs. 7545   
Log-likelihood -32734.02   
    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. p-values of the joint significance  of 
country fixed effects are reported in square brackets. All estimates are obtained using sample weights. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Intensity of R&D cooperation: Multivariate Tobit Model with Endogenous Explanatory Variables: Marginal 
Effects 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
University cooperation 
(2) 
Other firms cooperation 
(3) 
Within group cooperation 
    RDINT 0.0048*** 0.0553*** -0.0018 
 (0.0017) (0.0120) (0.0018) 
APPROF 0.5078*** 0.8577*** 0.1043 
 (0.0832) (0.1362) (0.0895) 
APPROI -0.2478 -2.3925** 0.8992 
 (0.6629) (1.1664) (0.9072) 
INSPEXT 2.4362*** 3.0774*** -0.5324 
 (0.5040) (1.0331) (0.4497) 
INSPGRO 0.6272 -1.6412 4.3149*** 
 (0.8677) (1.3953) (0.9701) 
INSPINT -0.2121 -2.5566 -1.5531 
 (0.8315) (1.6409) (1.0627) 
COST 0.3371*** 0.3967** -0.0871 
 (0.0962) (0.1990) (0.1295) 
RISK 0.2232 0.1614 0.3612 
 (0.2079) (0.2429) (0.2534) 
COMPIN 0.7483*** 0.0871 -0.4203 
 (0.2661) (0.4182) (0.3045) 
PCOMP 0.4261 0.1418 -0.0319 
 (0.4455) (0.8188) (0.5596) 
QCOMP -0.0123** 0.0031 0.0057 
 (0.0053) (0.0079) (0.0074) 
SIZE (log) 0.0886** 0.1861** 0.2221*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0780) (0.0666) 
DEMANAG 0.0772* 0.0015 0.1821*** 
 (0.0467) (0.0752) (0.0631) 
YOUNG 0.0358 0.0162 -0.1962 
 (0.1077) (0.1306) (0.1513) 
MEDAGE -0.0096 -0.0867 0.1661** 
 (0.0474) (0.0672) (0.0665) 
FOROWN -0.0031 -0.0129 0.7286*** 
 (0.0519) (0.1130) (0.1227) 
ABROAD 0.0793 -0.1620 -0.0988 
 (0.0764) (0.1058) (0.1004) 
EXTFIN 0.1581*** 0.2423*** -0.0998 
 (0.0450) (0.0782) (0.0799) 
RDTAX 0.0601 -0.2252** 0.0002 
 (0.0530) (0.1098) (0.0751) 
RDSUB 0.2642*** 0.2308** 0.0277 
 (0.0696) (0.0946) (0.0679) 
AUT 0.2499** -0.3006 -0.1918 
 (0.1143) (0.2685) (0.2253) 
FRA -0.0840 -0.5367** 0.0410 
 (0.1253) (0.2320) (0.1359) 
GER 0.3721*** -0.4239** -0.2092 
 (0.0779) (0.1789) (0.1376) 
HUN 0.2189 -1.0920*** -0.3771 
 (0.2041) (0.3558) (0.3001) 
ITA 0.0528 -0.3149 -0.0754 
 (0.1029) (0.1959) (0.1447) 
SPA 0.1289 -0.4693** -0.1584 
 (0.1231) (0.2168) (0.1459) 
    
 0.4175***   
(0.0362)   
 0.0668   
(0.0412)   
 0.0428   
(0.0324)   
    Significance of country fixed effects 39.82*** [0.0000] 14.54** [0.0241] 5.98 [0.4257] 
Obs. 7545   
Log-likelihood -37968.66   
    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. p-values of the joint significance  of 
country fixed effects are reported in square brackets. All estimates are obtained using sample weights. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A.1 – Variables Description 
Label Definition Source Description Type 
Dependent variables     
DRDUNI University cooperation Firm-level Firm cooperating in R&D with Universities and research institutions Dummy 
DRDGRO Group cooperation Firm-level Firm cooperating in R&D with firms of the same business group Dummy 
DRDOTH Other R&D cooperation Firm-level Firm cooperating in R&D with other firms Dummy 
PRDUNI University R&D cooperation int. Firm-level Intensity of university cooperation on turnover Continuous 
PRDGRO Group cooperation int. Firm-level Intensity of within-group cooperation on turnover Continuous 
PRDOTH External R&D cooperation int. Firm-level Intensity of cooperation with unaffiliated firms on turnover Continuous 
Main explanatory variables 
APPROF Strategic appropriability Firm-level Firm relying on legal measures to protect innovation (patents, industrial design, copyright, trademarks) Continuous 
APPROI Legal appropriability Industry-by-country % of firms relying on legal measures to protect innovation Continuous 
INSPINT Internal incoming spillovers Industry-by-country % of firms doing R&D internally Continuous 
INSPGRO Group incoming spillovers Industry-by-country % of firms doing R&D within the group Continuous 
INSPEXT External incoming spillovers Industry-by-country % of firms doing R&D with external firms and institutions Continuous 
RDINT R&D intensity Firm-level % of R&D workers on total employment Continuous 
COST Cost of R&D Firm-level Firm indicating cost factors as obstacle to R&D  
(regulation, standards; lack of appropriate sources of finance; lack of qualified personnel, organisational rigidities) 
Categorical 
RISK Risk of R&D Firm-level Firm indicating risk factors as obstacle to R&D  
(excessive perceived economic risks, lack of information on markets, lack of customer responsiveness to new 
products) 
Categorical 
COMPINT Competition intensity Industry-by-country % of firms having competitors abroad Continuous 
QCOMP Product quality competition Industry-by-country Avg % of turnover from innovative products Continuous 
PCOMP Product price competition Industry-by-country % of price-taker firms Continuous 
Other firm characteristics 
SIZE Firm size Firm-level Logs of employees Continuous 
SIZE2 Square of firm size Firm-level (Logs of employees)^2 Continuous 
DEMANAG Decentralized management Firm-level Firm adopting practice of decentralised management Dummy 
YOUNG Young firm Firm-level Firm being less than 7 years old from the establishment Dummy 
MEDAGE Medium-aged firm Firm-level Firm being between 7 and 20 years old from the establishment Dummy 
FOROWN Foreign holder Firm-level Firm with foreign owner Dummy 
ABROAD Active abroad Firm-level Firm active abroad with exporting, importing,  FDI, etc. Dummy 
EXTFIN Financial dependence Firm-level Firm using external funds to finance activities Dummy 
RDSUB R&D subsidy Firm-level Firm receiving public funding to R&D Dummy 
RDTAX R&D tax incentive Firm-level Firm benefiting from fiscal incentives to R&D Dummy 
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Table A.2 – Multivariate Probit Model with Exogenous Explanatory Variables: Marginal Effects 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
University cooperation 
(2) 
Other firms cooperation 
(3) 
Within group cooperation 
    RDINT 0.0006** 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
APPROF 0.1013*** 0.1370*** 0.0075 
 (0.0150) (0.0179) (0.0065) 
APPROI -0.0276 -0.3192** 0.0293 
 0.1013*** 0.1370*** 0.0075 
INSPEXT 0.4561*** 0.5500*** -0.0238 
 (0.0999) (0.1413) (0.0350) 
INSPGRO 0.1150 -0.1705 0.3445*** 
 (0.1576) (0.2056) (0.0617) 
INSPINT 0.0320 -0.2446 -0.0703 
 (0.1475) (0.2371) (0.0730) 
COST 0.0580*** 0.0707** -0.0013 
 (0.0162) (0.0277) (0.0085) 
RISK 0.0280 0.0301 0.0141 
 (0.0340) (0.0386) (0.0155) 
COMPIN 0.1216*** -0.0188 -0.0250 
 (0.0461) (0.0592) (0.0196) 
PCOMP 0.0774 0.0641 -0.0069 
 (0.0853) (0.1272) (0.0388) 
QCOMP -0.0027*** 0.0013 0.0002 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
SIZE (log) 0.0192*** -0.0075 0.0153*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0084) (0.0039) 
DEMANAG 0.0153** 0.0145 0.0139*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0106) (0.0034) 
YOUNG -0.0043 0.0006 -0.0187* 
 (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0096) 
MEDAGE 0.0000 -0.0024 0.0092** 
 (0.0083) (0.0107) (0.0040) 
FOROWN 0.0078 -0.0103 0.0530*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0142) (0.0063) 
ABROAD 0.0244** -0.0079 -0.0063 
 (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0067) 
EXTFIN 0.0297*** 0.0434*** -0.0053 
 (0.0070) (0.0103) (0.0052) 
RDTAX 0.0143 -0.0079 -0.0011 
 (0.0100) (0.0139) (0.0053) 
RDSUB 0.0480*** 0.0495*** 0.0006 
 (0.0109) (0.0144) (0.0047) 
AUT 0.0408** -0.0595 -0.0108 
 (0.0175) (0.0406) (0.0167) 
FRA -0.0128 -0.0564* 0.0043 
 (0.0232) (0.0329) (0.0099) 
GER 0.0662*** -0.0300 -0.0153* 
 (0.0137) (0.0249) (0.0086) 
HUN 0.0438 -0.1809*** -0.0228 
 (0.0394) (0.0555) (0.0197) 
ITA 0.0147 -0.0562** -0.0020 
 (0.0184) (0.0280) (0.0098) 
SPA 0.0242 -0.0750** -0.0108 
 (0.0211) (0.0331) (0.0102) 
    
 0.6855***   
(0.0295)   
 0.1234**   
(0.0480)   
 0.1584***   
(0.0441)   
    Significance of country fixed effects 56.39*** [0.0000] 18.04** [0.0135] 8.19 [0.2248] 
Obs. 7545   
Log-likelihood -6098.59   
    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. p-values of the joint significance  of 
country fixed effects are reported in square brackets. All estimates are obtained using sample weights. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A.3 – Reduced Form Equations of the Multivariate R&D Cooperation Propensity Model: 
Coefficient Estimates 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
RDINT 
(2) 
APPROF 
   APPROI 8.9206 0.9799*** 
 (7.2835) (0.0917) 
INSPEXT 6.2035 0.0306 
 (5.9950) (0.0807) 
INSPGRO 11.5097 -0.1003 
 (8.2468) (0.1232) 
INSPINT 15.0161 -0.1343 
 (11.2503) (0.1279) 
COST 0.3905 0.0338** 
 (1.3775) (0.0160) 
RISK 2.3111 0.0228 
 (1.8794) (0.0223) 
COMPIN -2.5174 -0.0617* 
 (2.4372) (0.0332) 
PCOMP 0.5016 -0.0596 
 (4.5090) (0.0715) 
QCOMP 0.2289*** 0.0010 
 (0.0561) (0.0007) 
SIZE -19.2969*** -0.0160 
 (1.9462) (0.0245) 
SIZE2 1.9399*** 0.0066** 
 -19.2969*** -0.0160 
DEMANAG 0.8559* 0.0297*** 
 (0.4618) (0.0073) 
YOUNG 1.2554 0.0099 
 (0.9306) (0.0142) 
MEDAGE 1.3090** 0.0027 
 (0.5829) (0.0062) 
FOROWN 0.2297 0.0055 
 (0.6661) (0.0118) 
ABROAD 0.9642 0.0687*** 
 (0.8393) (0.0060) 
EXTFIN 0.4445 0.0132** 
 (0.4359) (0.0067) 
RDTAX 3.7782*** 0.0172* 
 (0.7119) (0.0104) 
RDSUB 1.7711*** 0.0309*** 
 (0.6526) (0.0085) 
AUT -0.4413 -0.0085 
 (0.9656) (0.0191) 
FRA 2.7666*** 0.0123 
 (1.0317) (0.0180) 
GER 1.8550** -0.0115 
 (0.9439) (0.0163) 
HUN 3.6074* -0.0225 
 (1.8722) (0.0282) 
ITA 0.5505 -0.0408** 
 (1.1266) (0.0168) 
SPA 1.4463 -0.0432** 
 (1.2902) (0.0208) 
REDSALE -1.1418** -0.0185** 
 (0.5288) (0.0073) 
RDREG 1.1747*** – 
 (0.0859)  
NBANKS – 0.0055** 
  (0.0023) 
Constant 19.5943* 0.0839 
 (11.3182) (0.1462) 
   
 0.2297 0.0055 
(0.6661) (0.0118) 
 -0.2583*** 0.1144 
(0.0659) (0.1453) 
 -0.1961 0.1703 
(0.1655) (0.1539) 
   
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. All estimates are 
obtained using sample weights. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A.4 – Multivariate Tobit Model with Exogenous Explanatory Variables: Marginal Effects 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
University cooperation 
(2) 
Other firms cooperation 
(3) 
Within group cooperation 
    RDINT 0.0047*** 0.0041 -0.0018 
 (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0018) 
APPROF 0.5062*** 0.7884*** 0.1036 
 (0.0831) (0.1287) (0.0897) 
APPROI -0.2438 -1.7607* 0.9025 
 (0.6617) (0.9902) (0.9076) 
INSPEXT 2.4176*** 3.1443*** -0.5333 
 (0.5032) (0.9770) (0.4496) 
INSPGRO 0.6205 -1.1259 4.3155*** 
 (0.8682) (1.2765) (0.9704) 
INSPINT -0.2161 -2.2742 -1.5539 
 (0.8343) (1.4910) (1.0621) 
COST 0.3381*** 0.3989** -0.0868 
 (0.0960) (0.1825) (0.1296) 
RISK 0.2226 0.2775 0.3606 
 (0.2074) (0.2149) (0.2534) 
COMPIN 0.7485*** -0.0287 -0.4214 
 (0.2659) (0.3678) (0.3048) 
PCOMP 0.4235 0.1878 -0.0325 
 (0.4456) (0.7448) (0.5598) 
QCOMP -0.0124** 0.0141** 0.0058 
 (0.0053) (0.0067) (0.0074) 
SIZE (log) 0.0888** -0.0906* 0.2222*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0523) (0.0666) 
DEMANAG 0.0775* 0.0332 0.1822*** 
 (0.0466) (0.0660) (0.0631) 
YOUNG 0.0359 0.0666 -0.1961 
 (0.1075) (0.1236) (0.1513) 
MEDAGE -0.0098 -0.0300 0.1662** 
 (0.0472) (0.0676) (0.0665) 
FOROWN -0.0017 0.0188 0.7288*** 
 (0.0520) (0.1135) (0.1227) 
ABROAD 0.0789 -0.1365 -0.0987 
 (0.0764) (0.0951) (0.1004) 
EXTFIN 0.1573*** 0.2392*** -0.0997 
 (0.0449) (0.0707) (0.0799) 
RDTAX 0.0607 -0.0540 0.0003 
 (0.0530) (0.0930) (0.0751) 
RDSUB 0.2636*** 0.2902*** 0.0278 
 (0.0694) (0.0856) (0.0679) 
AUT 0.2537** -0.3094 -0.1914 
 (0.1142) (0.2639) (0.2253) 
FRA -0.0860 -0.3798* 0.0415 
 (0.1253) (0.2093) (0.1359) 
GER 0.3719*** -0.1541 -0.2090 
 (0.0777) (0.1633) (0.1375) 
HUN 0.2200 -1.0038*** -0.3770 
 (0.2039) (0.3144) (0.3003) 
ITA 0.0541 -0.2809 -0.0749 
 (0.1027) (0.1754) (0.1447) 
SPA 0.1284 -0.4187** -0.1582 
 (0.1232) (0.2085) (0.1459) 
    
 0.4515***   
(0.0384)   
 0.0681*   
(0.0409)   
 0.0526   
(0.0340)   
    Significance of country fixed effects 40.00*** [0.0000] 13.81** [0.0319] 5.98 [0.4249] 
    Obs. 7545   
Log-likelihood -311339.04   
    
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. p-values of the joint significance  of 
country fixed effects are reported in square brackets. All estimates are obtained using sample weights. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A.5 – Reduced Form Equations of the Multivariate R&D Cooperation Intensity Model: 
Coefficient Estimates 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
RDINT 
(2) 
APPROF 
   APPROI 9.0254 0.9825*** 
 (7.2490) (0.0913) 
INSPEXT 6.0015 0.0306 
 (6.0100) (0.0807) 
INSPGRO 11.6842 -0.1002 
 (8.2321) (0.1231) 
INSPINT 14.9863 -0.1326 
 (11.2002) (0.1277) 
COST 0.3784 0.0339** 
 (1.3792) (0.0160) 
RISK 2.3159 0.0227 
 (1.8828) (0.0223) 
COMPIN -2.5496 -0.0629* 
 (2.4318) (0.0334) 
PCOMP 0.5735 -0.0586 
 (4.5142) (0.0714) 
QCOMP 0.2282*** 0.0010 
 (0.0561) (0.0007) 
SIZE -19.2058*** -0.0163 
 (1.9475) (0.0245) 
SIZE2 1.9296*** 0.0066** 
 (0.2285) (0.0031) 
DEMANAG 0.8575* 0.0296*** 
 (0.4621) (0.0073) 
YOUNG 1.2607 0.0102 
 (0.9264) (0.0143) 
MEDAGE 1.2935** 0.0028 
 (0.5828) (0.0062) 
FOROWN 0.2202 0.0056 
 (0.6652) (0.0118) 
ABROAD 0.9674 0.0685*** 
 (0.8392) (0.0060) 
EXTFIN 0.4372 0.0130** 
 (0.4356) (0.0066) 
RDTAX 3.7935*** 0.0171 
 (0.7093) (0.0104) 
RDSUB 1.7329*** 0.0308*** 
 (0.6534) (0.0085) 
AUT -0.4136 -0.0091 
 (0.9626) (0.0190) 
FRA 2.7343*** 0.0118 
 (1.0347) (0.0179) 
GER 1.9627** -0.0123 
 (0.9478) (0.0161) 
HUN 3.3452* -0.0229 
 (1.8276) (0.0281) 
ITA 0.5217 -0.0423*** 
 (1.1270) (0.0164) 
SPA 1.4442 -0.0448** 
 (1.2857) (0.0204) 
REDSALE -1.1650** -0.0164** 
 (0.5276) (0.0078) 
RDREG 1.1362*** – 
 (0.0891)  
NBANKS – 0.0060*** 
  (0.0019) 
Constant 19.7976* 0.0820 
 (11.2368) (0.1461) 
   
 0.1518 -0.1409 
(0.1278) (0.1058) 
 -0.3690*** 0.1145 
(0.0814) (0.1076) 
 -0.2326 0.1808 
(0.1476) (0.2576) 
   
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are reported in parentheses below the estimates. All estimates are 
obtained using sample weights. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
